both the union and the employer. The circuits have split over the validity of these provisions. 6 Other methods employed by unions to discourage activities in opposition to an incumbent include the fining and suspension or expulsion of members who support a rival union or engage in other "conduct unbecoming a union member," such as attempting to decertify the incumbent. Although the use of fines in this situation has been disapproved, 7 neither the NLRB nor the courts have found the use of either suspension or expulsion to be an unfair labor practice. 8 This comment will examine the present rules governing control of union member activities in this area, through collective bargaining agreements and through internal union discipline. It will be suggested that a no-solicitation provision in a collective bargaining agreement must be held to constitute an unfair labor practice, that union-imposed fines have been properly rejected and expulsion improperly allowed as means of intra-union discipline for such activities, and that suspension for the period immediately preceding an election is a permissible reaction to antiunion activities. I .
WAIVERS OF SOLICITATION AND DISTRIBUTION RIGHTs IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS

A. The Response of the Legal System
It has generally been held to be an unfair labor practice under sections 8(a)(1) 9 and 8(a)(3) 10 of the NLRA for an employer unilaterally to promulgate or apply a rule disciplining employees for union solicitation during nonworking time or distribution of literature in nonworking areas of the plant."
1 Although this rule was originally devel- (1963) . The deposed president of the certified representative had circulated membership cards for an independent union. He was warned by his employer that he was in violation of collective bargaining contract provisions broadly prohibiting distribution and solicitation and would be discharged if he continued his activities. The Board found that promulgation of the provisions and the threat of discharge constituted unfair labor practices under section 8(a)(1) and struck down the rule except as applied to activities on behalf of the incumbent union. The Seventh Circuit denied enforcement, 337 F.2d 390 (7th Cir. 1964 ). See discussion of the Seventh Circuit's opinion in text and notes at notes 24-25 infra. The Board followed its Gale Products principle in a number of other cases, See, e. and distinguished restrictions on solicitation for incumbent unions from similar restraints on solicitation for competing unions, approving only the former. In NLRB v. Mid-States Metal Products Co., 16 the Fifth Circuit upheld a similar Board finding of a violation of section 8(a)(1) based on the discharge of an employee for circulating a decertification petition in violation of a contractual no-solicitation provision. In enforcing the Board's order, the court stated broadly that, although the right to engage in some forms of concerted activities can be waived by the bargaining representative, economic rights are distinguishable from the individual rights essential to proper selection and reevaluation of the collective bargaining representative.' 7 This distinction rested in part on the disparity of interest between unions and employees relative to employees' ability to oust their bargainingrepresentative.'
8
The Board has recently adopted a modification of its Gale Products decision, following the Eighth Circuit's decision in 1AM v. NLRB (McDonnell Douglas) .' 9 In that case, the Board had invalidated a no-distribution provision as to all parties except the incumbent union; 20 the circuit court, relying on Mid-States Metal Products, enforced the Board order, but only after modifying it to prohibit application of the provision to all union distributions, whether for or against the incumbent.
21
The Sixth and Seventh Circuits have accepted neither the Board's former position of partial invalidation nor the Board's and Eighth Circuit's current position of total invalidation. Instead, they have relied on dicta from early Board decisions 22 to support the principle that unions and take of negotiations." Bargaining for no-solicitation provisions that benefit most unit employees therefore might be within the scope of this authority.
7
Although a policy favoring private resolution of bargaining disputes can properly be followed with respect to waivers of certain rights to engage in concerted activity, such as the right to strike, 38 it seems inappropriate to apply the policy to union waivers of employee solicitation rights. Permitting the bargaining representative to waive employees' right to strike by negotiating a no-strike clause is logical given the nature of that right. First, the waiver of the right to strike seriously limits the power of the union as well as that of the employees, and the union has no incentive to abandon that right without receiving a substantial concession. Second, the NLRA's goal of promoting economic stability 9 is directly and substantially furthered by recognition of the parties' right to agree to limitations on rights to strike and lock out and to nondisruptive means of dispute settlement. 40 No-solicitation clauses do not have either of these positive attributes of no-strike clauses. First, in negotiations on a no-solicitation clause it is possible for the union to waive major employee rights without seriously prejudicing its own position; indeed, a no-solicitation clause, while weakening the rights of the individual employees, strengthens the position of the union. Second, the degree to which economic stability is promoted by restrictions on employees' freedom to solicit for decertification or replacement is much less significant than the stability provided by restrictions on their freedom to strike at any time. 36 See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S, 330, 338 (1952).
37 Under this approach, the Board would defer to the bargaining representative's judgment in determining whether there had been a significant benefit to employees from the waiver and would avoid anf nullification or redrafting of the contract that would alter the balance of benefits arrived at by the parties in their original agreement. 39 See NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970) . 40 In assessing the scope of restrictions on the right to strike, courts frequently consider whether the collective agreement provides for resort to arbitration for the dispute involved. [41:190 C. Union Authority to Negotiate a Contractual Waiver of Solicitation Rights Because a majority of employees must authorize the bargaining representative to represent all the employees in the unit, it has frequently been suggested that the representative is an agent of the employees. 41 Under agency principles, the representative might be authorized to waive employees' solicitation rights in exchange for benefits under a collective bargaining agreement. 42 Agency, however, is an inadequate description of the relationship between the representative and many of the employees in the unit. Many employees may never have voted for the union in a representation election, executed an authorization card, joined the union, or otherwise shown initial consent to the representative's agency. Contrary to common law rules of agency, 43 employees, whether consenting or nonconsenting, are not completely free to terminate the union's representation. 44 Thus, although some employees must have consented to the representation, agency law does not provide an adequate justification or explanation of the representative's power.
Alternatively, the ability of a labor organization to negotiate with an employer may be viewed as a function of its economic strength. A strong employee organization will wish to define the terms of employment of nonconsenting employees as a means of establishing uniformity in working conditions and reducing divisive competition in its mem- 
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bers' labor markets. Individuals or other groups of employees, however, will wish to make competing demands and offers, and it is not clear that a union could consistently command the power necessary to require the employer to bargain exclusively with that union. The provisions of the NLRA, however, guarantee exclusivity to majority unions and limit the right of other groups to bargain with or exercise economic power against the employer. 45 Consequently, when the union acts to impose terms of employment on all members of the bargaining unit, including individuals who would not have supported the union, it should be viewed as exercising power derived from the NLRA. When this authority is exercised, particular attention should be paid to restrictions that the Act explicitly or implicitly imposes on union actions.
It is reasonable to conclude that Congress did not intend to authorize bargaining representatives to abridge freedom of communication among their constituencies. A major purpose of the NLRA and subsequent labor legislation was to provide employees power to influence their working conditions. If the legislation is to foster self-determination for employees, it must protect a free flow of information about the beliefs and activities of the bargaining representative and of opposing factions. 4 401-02 (1950) . A finding of state action, however, would not necessarily lead to limitations on union power to waive employee solicitation rights. It might be argued that because the right to solicit and distribute on employer premises is generally treated as a statutory rather than a constitutional right, see, e.g., Central Hardware.Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539 (1972), Congress could delegate to the bargaining representative authority to restrict this right. It is not dear, therefore, that a finding of state action through affirmative grants of power preciudes a bargaining representative from waiving employee solicitation rights.
The second ground on which state action might be found is the existence of a strong similarity or kinship between government and the labor organization. This similarity can [41:190 representatives, and thus over working conditions, would be severely restricted.
The existence of alternative channels for communication of such information, emphasized by the Sixth Circuit in Armco, 47 is irrelevant; the same detriment to the employee that led to the general proscription of employer-imposed no-solicitation rules without regard to the existence of alternative means of communication 48 exists when contractual provisions are enforced.
In the absence of clear evidence that employee interests are served by rules restricting communication, employees should retain their right to distribute and solicit in the most appropriate forum, the place of work. 49 Actions of a bargaining representative that abridge this right should be held a violation of the representative's duty of fair representation and coercive of the employees' section 7 rights and, thus, a violation of section 8(b)(1)(A).
5 0 Since the employer cannot rely on the bargaining representative's acquiescence to justify an otherwise prohibited restriction, 51 any attempt by the employer to enforce such a clause should be held a violation of section 8(a)(1).
II.
INTRA-UNION DISCIPLINE FOR ATTEMPTS TO
REmoVE BARGAINING REPRESENTATIVES 52 A union's power to restrict its members' activities, unlike its authority to negotiate bargaining agreement provisions affecting all unit employees, is not based on authority granted by federal labor legislation. be found in the underlying assumption of the NLRA that the unit employee, unlike members of other organizations in our society, is not free to leave the unit and thus may become, in effect, an involuntary subject of the "legislating" union. It might be argued from this that an employee must be accorded a constitutional right to select those who will govern him. Nevertheless, although the Board and the courts have deemed the right to organize and select representatives a "fundamental" one under the Act, see UAW v. 
1973]
The University of Chicago Law Review
Unions have historically been considered voluntary associations. 53 They generally have been allowed to enforce even arbitrary conditions to restrict membership 54 and to fine, suspend, or expel members by nondiscriminatory procedures provided in the union constitution or bylaws. 55 The NLRA leaves this situation unchanged in most respects. Thus, although section 8(b)(1)(A) prohibits the union from restraining employees' exercise of their rights, the section's proviso states: "this paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein." 56 The union's right to impose such discipline on its members is considered a term of a contract between the union and its members 57 or among the members. 58 Union constitutions or by-laws frequently provide that recalcitrant members may be fined, suspended, or expelled for strikebreaking, dual unionism, or "conduct unbecoming a union member"-such as seeking to replace the union with another bargaining representative. Union-imposed discipline is a powerful disincentive to union members' seeking to exercise their section 7 rights by decertifying or replacing the incumbent union.
Although the relevant sections of the NLRA and LMRDA make no explicit distinctions between expulsion, suspension, and fines, 59 the courts have held that a union may punish decertification and replacement efforts by suspending or expelling, but not by fining, the dissident member. 6 0 These decisions seem correct insofar as they forbid fines, but incorrect in allowing expulsion and overbroad in allowing suspension for all decertification activities. A careful weighing of the union and employee interests involved, in light of the justifications offered by the courts for suspension and expulsion, suggests that the only permissible response should be suspension from the time a decertification or election petition is filed until the end of the campaign.
A. Fines
The Supreme Court has held that fines may be used to enforce a union rule that is "properly adopted . . .
[and] reflects a legitimate union interest, impairs no policy Congress has imbedded in the labor laws, and is reasonably enforced against union members who are free to leave the union and escape the rule." 61 The Court has also held that the Board is not authorized to inquire into the reasonableness of the amount of otherwise valid fines.
0 2
The use of fines to restrain access of members to Board processes, however, has been held an unfair labor practice. For example, in Charles S. Skura, 63 the NLRB found that a union had violated section 8(b)(1)(A) by imposing a fine on a member who had filed an unfair labor practice charge against the union. The Board pointed out that effective administration of the NLRA requires filing of unfair labor practice charges by individuals because the General Counsel is unable to initiate such an action. 4 The Board then stated: "Considering the overriding public interest involved .... a rule.., by means of which a union seeks to prevent or limit access to the Board's processes is beyond the lawful competency of a labor organization to enforce by coercive means." 65 
In NLRB v. International Molders and Allied Workers
Local 125 (Blackhawk Tanning), 6 6 the Seventh Circuit adopted the same approach. Apparently untroubled by possible inconsistency with its earlier approval of contractual waivers of employee solicitation rights, including the circulation of decertification petitions, 6 7 the court enforced a Board finding that the union had violated section 8(b)(1)(A) by fining a union member for circulating a decertification petition.
68
The court stressed that employees must have a right of access to the Board's processes without impediments by private organizations.
69
When this right conflicts with union interests, "section 8(b)(1)(A) and its proviso envision a balancing of the rights of the union against the rights of employees and members on a case by case basis. '' 70 The court then stated that a decertification petition, unlike an unfair labor practice charge, "attacks the very existence of the union as exclusive bargaining agent," 71 thus justifying defensive action by the union. Fines, however, were not seen as serving these defensive purposes: "Once a member pays the fine, he retains his membership and is able to attend meetings and learn of union strategy .... [The fine's] only effect is to punish a member who wishes to oust the union...."7 In Local 702, 1AM v. Loudermilk, 73 the Fifth Circuit held that the imposition of a fine on a union member for joining and supporting another union infringed the free speech rights guaranteed him under section 101(a)(2) of the LMRDA. 7 4 In reaching this conclusion the court applied a balancing test, similar to that used in Blackhawk Tanning, to the proviso of section 101(a)(2) which states: "nothing herein shall be construed to impair the right of a labor organization to adopt [ 41:190 and enforce reasonable rules as to the responsibility of every member toward the organization as an institution .... ,,5
In conclusion, the Board and the courts have found the imposition of fines as punishment for support of a rival union or decertification efforts to be a violation of the NLRA and the LMRDA because the infringement of employee rights caused by fines is not outweighed by any legitimate union interest in imposing the fine.
B. Expulsion
In NLRB v. Industrial Union of Marine Workers 76 the Supreme
Court restricted the right of unions to expel members for filing unfair labor practice charges with the Board before exhausting internal union remedies. The Court enforced the Board's order that the expelled member be restored to membership, 77 emphasizing that "overriding public interest makes unimpeded access to the Board the only healthy alternative, except and unless plainly internal affairs of the union are involved." 78 The Court explained: "[T]he proviso in Section 8(b)(1) (A) that unions may design their own rules respecting 'the acquisition or retention of membership' is not so broad as to give the union power to penalize a member who invokes the protection of the Act for a matter that is in the public domain and beyond the internal affairs of the union." '7 9 In light of this prohibition of suspension and expulsion as a means of penalizing union members for resorting to Board processes and the Seventh Circuit's prohibition of fines as a means of punishing union members who seek to oust the incumbent union, 80 it might be expected that a union would have no right to expel or suspend a member for activities intended to secure the removal of the union as unit bargaining representative. The Board and the courts, however, have refused to prohibit suspensions or expulsion for such activities. 
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In Tawas Tube Productssl 1 objections to a decertification election were based on the expulsion of two employees from the union for actively supporting a decertification movement. The Board pointed out that "even a narrow reading of the [section 8(b)(1)(A)] proviso would necessarily allow a union to expel members who attack the very existence of the union as an institution," 8 2 and upheld the results of the election. The Board concluded: "It would be difficult for the Union to carry on an election campaign were [dissident members] entitled to 'equal rights and privileges .. to attend membership meetings, and to participate in the deliberations and voting upon the business of such meetings . . .' rights now guaranteed to union members by Section 101(a)(1) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act." 83 The Board stated that a member's opposition to the union reflects a lack of concern over continued membership in the union. Skura was distinguished on the ground that the actions involved in that case were designed only to make the union abide by the Act; the dissident member had not threatened the union's very existence.
8 4 Because the Board applies more stringent standards in determining whether an election was conducted under requisite laboratory conditions than it applies to the determination of whether conduct violates section 8,8
5 the holding in Tawas Tube clearly indicates that the Board would not consider such an expulsion a violation of section 8(b)(1) (A).
In Price v. NLRB 6 the Ninth Circuit, relying on Tawas Tube and distinguishing Skura, upheld the Board's dismissal of an unfair labor practice complaint based on 8(b)(1)(A), made by a member who had been suspended from membership for filing a decertification petition, The court stressed that the member's action had been "in a very real sense an attack on the very existence of the union" 87 and held that the union's action was protected by the proviso to 8(b)(1)(A).
The basis for treating fines differently from suspension or expulsion may in part be found in the different weights accorded the forms of discipline in the Blackhawk Tanning balancing test. 88 In that case the Seventh Circuit attempted to distinguish the sanctions by finding that [41:190 fines were neither necessary nor effective in protecting the union as an institution. 9 Suspension and expulsion---characterized by the Board in Tawas Tube as "defensive" measures-were, however, seen as both effective and appropriate. The Board in Tawas Tube 90 and the Ninth Circuit in Price 9 ' had stressed this point, saying that in an election contest between the incumbent and the union favored by the dissident member, the incumbent's status as bargaining representative would be endangered were it forced to keep an insurgent in its midst. Suspension or expulsion, according to this view, effectively removes a member who might pose a substantial threat to the continued viability of the union as bargaining representative.
A balancing is necessary between the interests of the union in meeting its responsibilities and preserving its institutional status 92 and the interests of the member in continued membership. In setting up the interests to be balanced, however, the Board and the courts have failed to set forth accurately the interests of the employee in retaining membership, the differing union interests in the contexts of the circulation of a decertification petition and an election campaign, and the different effects of expulsion and suspension on the employee and the union. It has frequently been asserted that an employee's opposition to the incumbent union indicates that he has no significant interest in retaining union membership; 93 this is simply incorrect. First, although expulsion or suspension for opposition to the union should have no direct 89 Fines, like suspension or expulsion, have been found to be inherently coercive within the meaning of section 8(b)(1)(A). See NLRB v. Molder's Local 125, 442 F.2d 92, 94 (7th Cir. 1971 ). Since they are coercive, it is clear that they have some effect in protecting the union against active opposition. Thus, the distinction between fines and suspension or expulsion drawn in Blackhawk Tanning and other cases implies that deterrence per se is not a "legitimate" union interest. A valid defensive measure is evidently one that protects the union by preventing disruption of its processes or frustration of its efforts to communicate with unit employees, not merely one that protects its position. 
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effect on the employee's job, 94 practice may not match theory; even where the employer intends to obey the dictates of section 8(a)(3), the employee may not be aware of those protections. In addition, the dissident may have other economic interests in retaining membership, such as union strike benefits or pension plan coverage. 5 The employee participating in decertification or replacement activities also may recognize the possibility of and wish protection against a failure of this particular means of control of his leadership. He may, therefore, desire to retain a voice in "internal" union decisions that will profoundly affect his interests. 9 6 Expulsion or suspension deprives him of the opportunity to participate in this form of control over his working environment.7
The basic ground for approving suspension and expulsion has been that they are "valid defensive measures" because they prevent the member from either disrupting meetings or disclosing strategy. 98 The union's need for these defenses, however, is questionable. Section 101(a)(2) of the LMRDA 9 9 expressly protects the right of a union to control disruption of meetings regardless of the reason for the disruption. It is doubtful that meetings of a union seeking to protect its incumbency involve discussion of strategy that must be kept secret from rivals. Deterring opposition is not a valid union interest because it conflicts with NLRA policies of self-determination. 100 Moreover, although the union may feel threatened by a solicitation of opposition whenever it occurs, it is only when support is strong and an election imminent that the threat is serious. Solicitation of opposition is a necessary aspect of pre-election campaigning, but often its only effect is to test support for a dissident faction and alert union leadership to a need for a change in their policies. The powerful defensive tool of barring a member from union activities should not be allowed unless an election is potentially imminent. Specifically, use of the tool should be allowed only within a limited time, for example sixty days, before the date when a petition for decertification or replacement may be filed. 
